Square peg versus a round hole? The necessity of a Bill of Rights for workers by Collins, P
Academic Contribution
Square peg versus a round
hole? The Necessity of a
Bill of Rights for Workers
Philippa Collins
Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, UK
Abstract
The exercise of human rights is put at risk by the creation, conduct, and termination of employ-
ment relationships. For this reason, we often find that fundamental rights arguments are invoked in
disputes between employers and workers and the mechanisms of labour and employment law are
pressed to vindicate those rights through a process of ‘constitutionalisation’. Notably, the
European Convention on Human Rights, through the doctrine of positive obligations, places
important demands upon national legal systems, their legislators and their judges, to protect the
rights of individuals against other private parties. Taking the law of dismissal in England & Wales as
an illustrative example, this article argues that the current approach to safeguarding workers’ rights
and complying with the Convention’s positive obligations is inadequate. Making adjustments to the
existing structure of employment rights will always be insufficiently radical as those structures are
ill-suited to performing this function, their limitations are systemic and furthermore the judiciary is
unwilling to disrupt the established analytical approach. Instead, I propose and detail an alternative
solution: introducing a Bill of Rights that would render the rights of the European Convention
enforceable between worker and employer.
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In modern life, it is clear that private actors, not traditionally bound by constitutions or interna-
tional rights declarations, pose a significant threat to an individual’s exercise of their human
rights.1 It is not novel to observe that healthcare and transport providers, insurers and banks,
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retailers and service providers all have the capacity to have an impact upon a person’s enjoyment
of their fundamental rights. We have decades of case law as well as many anecdotes, reports and
investigations that show that relationship of employment similarly puts one’s rights at risk. Some
have even gone as far as to argue that there is an inherent conflict between the subordination of an
individual to another via an employment contract and the free and autonomous exercise of fun-
damental rights.2 Through their power of dismissal, employers are able to enforce their preferences
and demands upon their workforce, on many occasions expanding their authority well beyond the
boundaries of working time and influencing the most fundamental choices made by their workers.
In recognition of the threat posed by employers to the exercise of human rights by individuals in
work, the labour relations context has been a key area of activity in the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the
private sphere across many jurisdictions. Here, by ‘constitutionalisation’, I mean the extent and
means by which vertical rights usually held in relation to the state become actionable or influential
in horizontal relationships.3 Across European jurisdictions, a number of general approaches can be
identified towards this phenomenon although the fundamental rights at stake may come from a
variety of sources, national, regional or international. A general divide has been drawn between
direct effect, which pushes aside existing private law rules or doctrines to ensure that human rights
are adequately secured; and indirect effect.4 The latter is a process whereby the existing private law
is interpreted and shaped (to varying degrees) to reflect and enforce fundamental rights in private
litigation. Common pathways to the horizontal effect of human rights include: constitutional
review of a private law decision or statute; an obligation or willingness to interpret existing
legislation in accordance with fundamental rights; the pervasion of human rights through general
clauses of a civil code; and the evolution of case law in a manner reflective of those rights. Each
route, or combination of routes, holds vast potential to reshape the established rights, rules and
decisions of labour law.5
The course taken in each jurisdiction is intimately linked to its judicial and constitutional
apparatus.6 For example, the rights contained in the German Constitution are considered to be a
set of values which have a radiating effect throughout the legal system, including private law.7 In
Greece, the applicability of human rights between private parties was acknowledged in the 2001
Constitution and the courts have adopted a range of approaches including direct horizontal effect
2. Hugh Collins, ‘Is the Contract of Employment Illiberal?’ in Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester and Virginia Mantouvalou
(eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2018) 58.
3. See Hans W. Micklitz, ‘Introduction’ in Hans W. Micklitz (ed.), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford
University Press, 2014). In labour law discourse, ‘constitutionalisation’ can also refer to the elevation of rights previ-
ously seen as labour rights to the status of fundamental human rights: see, for example, Judy Fudge, ‘The New Discourse
of Labour Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?’ (2007) 29 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 29; and
Harry Arthurs, ‘The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Multiple Models, Pernicious Problems’ (2010) 19
Social & Legal Studies 403.
4. See Alison Young, ‘Mapping horizontal effect’ in David Hoffman (ed.), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on
Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Aharon Barak, ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’ in
Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez, Human Rights in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2001).
5. We may wish to query whether labour law or employment law can or should be considered private law, despite their
traditional classification as such: Mark Freedland, ‘Employment Law’ in John Bell, Sophie Boyron and Simon Whit-
taker (eds.), Principles of French Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2008).
6. See the exploration in Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Judicial Governance’
in Hans W. Micklitz (ed.), Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2014).
7. BVerfGE 7, 198 ff of 15 January 1958 (Lüth).
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and indirect effect through general clauses and statutory interpretation.8 Within Europe, the UK is
unique. Important contributors to the constitutionalisation process, a written constitution or a civil
code, are both absent. For this reason, it is an interesting case study to examine. In common with
other jurisdictions, statutory interpretation has been a key element in seeking to reflect human
rights in private relationships. The Human Rights Act 1998 mandates that statutes should be
interpreted compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’ or ‘the
Convention’) as far as it is possible to do so.9 In the labour and employment sphere, where statutory
regulation dominates,10 this obligation is a powerful tool for litigators. How far this obligation has
resulted in true compliance with the Convention, however, is the topic of this article.
The European Convention provides a common standard across most European jurisdictions
regarding the safeguarding of human rights in the private sphere, although its impact undoubtedly
varies per jurisdiction.11 The role of human rights in disputes between private actors has been
advanced through the European Court of Human Rights’ (‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) doctrine of
positive obligations.12 Where many of the rights contained in the Convention consist of a negative
prohibition upon the state, an obligation not to infringe a particular right, positive obligations require
some action. Amongst other obligations, the state is mandated to put in place measures to ensure that
individuals’ rights are safeguarded from infringement by other private actors.13 Without undertaking
these steps, the protection of human rights in a jurisdiction would be incomplete and flawed. Just as a
direct infringement by a Member State of an Article of the European Convention on Human Rights
leads to a finding of breach, so too would a failure to comply with the state’s positive obligations.
Below, I will develop an account of three key positive obligations that the Council of Europe
Member States are subject to as a result of the Court’s jurisprudence. The main body of this article
will focus on assessing the approach adopted by the English legal system in attempting to comply
with these obligations. Here, I argue that the method adopted by the courts, the legislator and the
commentators is an ‘adaptive’ one. Where litigation or analysis exposes the existence of a gap or
inadequacy in the protection of Convention rights in dispute about work, either the judges,14 or
occasionally Parliament,15 are called upon to rectify the problem. For specific problems, specific
8. Christina Akrivopoulou, ‘Taking Private Law Seriously in the Application of Constitutional Rights’ in Dawn Oliver
and Jörg Fedtke (ed.), Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).
9. Human Rights Act 1998, section 6.
10. ACL Davies, ‘The Relationship between the Contract of Employment and Statute’ in Mark Freedland (ed.), The
Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016).
11. Contrast, for example, the ‘Conventionalisation’ of private law in France with the lack of emphasis on the ECHR in
Germany and Greece: see Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘France - Horizontal Application and the Triumph of the European
Convention on Human Rights’; Jörg Fedtke, ‘Drittwirkung in Germany’; and Christina Akrivopoulou, ‘Greece -
Taking Private Law Seriously in the Application of Constitutional Rights’ in Human Rights and the Private Sphere, n. 8
above.
12. For a detailed discussion of the doctrine of positive obligations, see Laurens Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive
State: Rethinking the Relationship between Positive and Negative Obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights (Intersentia, 2016).
13. A number of prominent cases regarding the doctrine of positive obligations were set within an employment dispute: see
Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 20; Wilson v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 20; and
Sánchez v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24.
14. See, for example, X v Y [2004] EWCA Civ 662, [2004] ICR 1634; Vining and others v London Borough of Wandsworth
[2017] EWCA Civ 1092, [2017] IRLR 1140; and Gilham v Ministry of Justice [2019] UKSC 44, [2020] 1 All ER 1.
15. See the amendment to unfair dismissal law made in Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 after the ECtHR’s
decision in Redfearn v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 2.
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solutions are found. The academic commentary generally adopts the same process: the existing law
is probed for deficiencies, and amendments are proposed to fix the problem.16 My argument is that
the adaptive approach is doomed to fail. It fails to confront the fundamental and systemic tensions
between the origins, design and judicial approach to the enforcement of employment and labour
law and the demands of human rights documents, in this case the positive obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights.
What, then, can colleagues from other jurisdictions learn from the challenge levelled here?
Firstly, the targeted nature of the modifications prioritised by an adaptive approach is likely to be
common to a number of jurisdictions. To assess fully a system of labour law and ensure that
individuals receive appropriate protection of their human rights at work, a rounded view of the
whole regime is needed. In practice, however, litigation is often the driving force of the analytical
process. Litigation focuses on specific facts and confined legal issues. It side-lines a far-reaching
evaluative process, such as the one embarked upon here. Within each jurisdiction, we must ask:
have we done enough to ensure that workers’ human rights are safeguarded? Secondly, some of the
tensions exposed below between the Convention’s positive obligations and the existing labour law
regime of England & Wales may be replicated in other countries. For example, labour law’s
traditional focus on subordinate and dependent work relationships will be explored below, as well
as the clear challenge posed to this confined scope by the Convention’s universality. Where the
private law regime in question has been designed in accordance with specific purposes and through
a process of political compromise, limitations are bound to arise when it is examined from a
fundamental rights perspective. This piece focuses on the challenges that arise in the UK, and
in England and Wales (E&W) specifically, but many of the deficiencies exposed may have
counterparts in other jurisdictions that are subject to, and in tension with, the same obligations
under the European Convention.
As it is the ultimate threat and the most severe way in which an employer could infringe upon
the human rights of an individual worker, this article focuses on the regulation of dismissal. There
are two ways in which the law in E&W regulates the employer’s right to terminate employment:
via statute (unfair dismissal) and via the common law of the contract of employment (wrongful
dismissal). Both, it has been argued, could be adapted and amended to reach a point at which they
are able to vindicate the fundamental rights of individuals and comply with the European Con-
vention. Section I will introduce both branches of dismissal law and give examples of ways in
which the adaptive model could be applied to make adjustments to their operation to improve the
standard of fundamental rights protection. In section II, I draw upon ECtHR case law to formulate
three key positive obligations imposed upon Member States in the employment sphere, focusing
particularly on those associated with the qualified rights in the Convention. Here, I begin to expose
some of the difficulties and limitations of the ‘adaptive model’ when applied to the law of
dismissal.
The third section turns to dismissal law and conducts a comprehensive evaluation of whether it
is capable of fulfilling the role of properly safeguarding human rights. From the origins and
purposes, to the operation and design of the causes of action, there are deep-seated tensions
16. See, for example, Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’ in Mark
Freedland (ed.), The Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016), in particular 202-207, Joe Atkinson,
‘Implied Terms and Human Rights in the Contract of Employment’ (2019) 48 ILJ 515; and Hugh Collins and Virginia
Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’ (2013) 76 MLR 909.
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between dismissal law and the demands of the Convention. This section concludes with an argu-
ment that the judges who develop or apply the law are either confident that dismissal law has
already achieved compliance or reluctant to engage fully with the human rights dimensions of
dismissal cases. This polarity of judicial viewpoints presents a very particular challenge to the
standards of Convention protection: difficulties with effective enforcement in the lower courts and
tribunals but a lack of urgency regarding judicial intervention at the senior level.
In the final part of the piece, I propose an alternative solution to the problem of non-compliance:
a legislative framework that would render the Convention rights enforceable between worker and
employer. It thus firmly adopts a doctrine of horizontal direct effect, albeit tailored specifically for
the employment context.17 The suggested framework goes beyond providing retrospective inter-
vention upon a dismissal: other forms of detriment would be included in addition to mechanisms to
challenge prospectively employer practices or contractual terms that undermine the exercise of
fundamental rights at work. In extending the regulatory proposal beyond the events surrounding
dismissal decisions, I move past the current literature’s focus primarily on dismissal law and
provide a means of ensuring consistent compliance with the Convention. I focus on the mechan-
isms of protection available under the Bill, drawing upon the regulatory techniques of human rights
law and discrimination law in particular. The concluding section will note avenues for expansion
of the legislative proposal.
I. The current approach: Reshaping the hole to fit the peg
In dismissal proceedings, there are two ways in which an employer could infringe upon one’s
fundamental rights. The reason for the dismissal might relate to how the individual has exercised
those rights or, in the process of investigating or making the decision, a right may be infringed
upon. If the worker is a trade union member or representative and faces detriment as a result of that
membership or status, they could look to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation)
Act 1992. If the reason for the dismissal or ill-treatment is related to one’s gender, sexual orienta-
tion, manifestation of a religious belief or other protected personal characteristic, the Equality Act
2010 may provide a remedy. Other specific events attract particular safeguards, such as whistle-
blowing18 or a breach of data privacy.19 But not all human rights infringements are matched with
specific protection. For example, Mr Redfearn sought to challenge his employer’s decision to
dismiss him as a result of his activities as a member of the right-wing British National Party,20 and
Mr Williams was subject to an invasive electronic investigation by his employer, in breach of his
Article 8 right to privacy.21 These claimants were unable to turn to a specific cause of action. In
these circumstances, there are two main routes through which a worker could attempt to vindicate
their human rights.
17. See Collins’ concerns regarding the unmodified transplantation of vertical human rights into a horizontal private
setting: Hugh Collins, ‘On the Incompatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in Hans W. Micklitz (ed.),
Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 34-6.
18. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.
19. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC [2016] OJ L-119/1.
20. Redfearn v Serco Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 659, [2006] ICR 1367.
21. Williams v Leeds United Football Club [2015] EWHC 376 (QB), [2015] IRLR 383.
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The first is to rely on the statutory claim of unfair dismissal and argue that either the reason or
the manner of the dismissal was unfair in light of the employer’s infringement upon the worker’s
human rights. The statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed requires the employer to produce a
fair reason for a dismissal, such as a lack of capability or misconduct on the employee’s part,22 and
to convince an Employment Tribunal that they acted reasonably in treating that reason as a
justification for the dismissal.23 If the employer is not successful in either endeavour, the employee
can request to return to their old job or, most commonly, receive an award of compensation.24 As a
right derived from statute, it has been accepted that the law of unfair dismissal must be read and
applied in a manner compatible with the Convention due to the operation of section 6 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’).25 This statutory route is the one most tested by litigation thus far and
demonstrates the acceptance in English law of the statutory form of indirect horizontal effect.26
The second route through which one could seek to incorporate human rights components is
contractual, arguing that the employer has committed a breach of the contract of employment
through their decisions and entitling the worker to damages at common law. A common law claim
would arise in response to disciplinary actions that are not in accordance with the terms of the
contract27 or conduct in breach of an obligation implied by law into contracts of employment, such
as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.28 For a time, it was considered possible that the
manner of a dismissal could result in breach of this same implied obligation but this was closed off
in Johnson v Unisys Ltd,29 discussed further below. Currently, a dismissal is mostly likely to be
wrongful if it is in breach of the entitlement to a notice period. A successful claimant is entitled to
damages or, in an appropriate case, an injunction to end a continuing breach of contract. It has been
suggested that the open-ended range of implied terms could be developed to provide protection for
the Convention rights of workers,30 disclosing a common law route to the fulfilment of the positive
obligations that those rights entail.
These alternatives are examples of the currently dominant method of providing a resolution for
claimants who have had their human rights infringed upon by their employer. Here, I label it ‘the
adaptive model’. We take the mechanisms outlined above and tweak, adapt or extend them in
suggested ways and thereby ensure that the claimant has an adequate route to challenge their
employer’s rights-infringing behaviour or decisions. For example, we might recommend that, as
there is no express term in the contract of employment that employers must respect the human
rights of their employees, the range of terms implied by law should be expanded to encompass
these rights.31 Discussion then focuses upon whether such a development is likely and what
22. Employment Rights Act 1996, section 98(2).
23. ibid, section 98(4).
24. ibid, sections 113-123.
25. See X v Y, n. 14 above.
26. See also the notable case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557.
27. For example, Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch), [2012] All ER (D) 201.
28. See Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [1998] AC 20; Bliss v South East Thames Regional
Health Trust [1985] IRLR 308; TSB Bank Plc v Harris [2000] IRLR 157; Stevens v University of Birmingham [2015]
EWHC 2300 (QB), [2015] IRLR 899.
29. Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518.
30. Bob Hepple, ‘Human Rights and Employment Law’ [1998] Amicus Curiae 19; and Bob Hepple, Rights at Work:
Global, European and British Perspectives (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 56.
31. See Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’, n. 16 above, 205 and Atkinson, n. 16
above.
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specific form it could most desirably take. With regard to unfair dismissal law, it has been argued
that, where a claimant has been dismissed for a reason related to an exercise of their Convention
rights, the usual qualifying period that bars a claim by new employees should not apply to the
case.32 Other suggestions in line with an adaptive approach can be found across the growing
literature in this area.
The difficulty that this piece exposes with this model for compliance with the Convention is that
it simply does not go far enough. Whilst each proposal responds to a particular problem or a
specific statement by the ECtHR, a step back is required. The Convention’s demands upon the
domestic framework present a clear and systemic challenge to the foundational assumptions
underlying the mechanisms as they stand and the extent to which UK employment law currently
underperforms when analysed from this perspective is not fully recognised. Minor changes to the
structure of protection and the approach of the courts are insufficient to achieve full compliance: it
is the argument of this article that a legislative solution is required, designed in light of the
requirements of the Convention and dedicated to the effective enforcement of the human rights
of workers.
II. The ECHR’s positive obligations in the employment sphere
To assess the national standard of protection of human rights in the workplace, we must have an
understanding of the expectations placed upon the legal framework by the Convention. Here, my
focus is particularly upon the qualified rights of the Convention, which are commonly invoked in
employment litigation and are incorporated into UK law through the HRA 1998. It is the HRA that
generates, under domestic law, an expectation of compliance with the Convention that extends
well into private law mechanisms33 and the ECHR’s doctrine of positive obligations which gives
classically vertical rights a ‘horizontal dimension’.34 Rather than simply requiring inaction or non-
interference from Member States’ authorities, positive obligations require action to ensure the
enjoyment and protection of Convention rights in their jurisdiction, particularly for our purposes
when a right has been violated by another private parties such as an employer. Articles 8 (respect
for private life), 9 (freedom of thought and religion), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom
of association) entail a number of comparable positive obligations upon Council of Europe Mem-
ber States, which can be derived from ECtHR case law. I argue here that there are three key
obligations: to reflect the universality of human rights by providing all individuals with an oppor-
tunity to challenge a potential Convention infringement; to incorporate the Convention’s principles
through the application of an aim/necessity analysis; and to recognise the seriousness of a Con-
vention infringement by offering the individual an adequate remedy. A failure on the part of the
32. Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, n. 16 above, 916.
33. The two most noted examples are Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457, where the tort of breach of
confidence was ‘radically remodelled to protect privacy’ and the values of Article 8 (see G. Phillipson, ‘Privacy: the
development of breach of confidence – the clearest case of horizontal effect?’ in David Hoffman (ed.), The Impact of
the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 163); and Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, n.
26 above, in which the legislation was re-interpreted to extend the right to succeed to a partner’s tenancy to same sex
couples.
34. Olha Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the control of private acts by the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2006) 13
Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 195, 197.
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UK to comply with any of these positive obligations could result in a successful challenge before
the ECtHR.
The first requirement is that an individual who believes that their Convention rights have been
infringed upon must be able to make a complaint to a court or tribunal and receive a ruling from
that court. The Convention’s safeguards are universal and in cases where a violation of a qualified
right has been found, it is ‘decisive’ in the context of the state’s positive obligations ‘that the
domestic courts or tribunals be allowed to pronounce on whether or not, in the circumstances of a
particular case, the interests of the employer should prevail over the [Convention] rights asserted
by the employee’.35 This entitlement to review does not attach to individuals by reason of their
employment, their occupation or their contractual status and the ECtHR does not take account of
how national systems may demarcate and distribute rights amongst the workforce.36 The universal
obligation to protect, the Court’s inclusive approach to identifying individuals as entitled to its
attention,37 and the requirement not to discriminate between individuals in the enjoyment of their
Convention rights38 (for example, on the ground that they are not classified as ‘employees’ by the
national courts) present a stark challenge to the boundaries of domestic employment law.
The Convention’s inclusivity conflicts with the exclusivity of employment rights: the statutory
and common law protections at issue here are available only to the tightly confined category of
‘employees’. Defined by a battery of constricting tests and indicators,39 the ‘contract of employ-
ment’ has proved to be an effective exclusionary devise.40 Where the domestic tribunals seek
‘control’, ‘integration’ and a lack of economic risk in order to hear an employee’s case, the ECtHR
pays no regard to these factors before considering an individual’s complaint. A chasm between the
two systems is therefore exposed, but the adaptive method is yet to confront fully the tension
between the dominant position of the contract of employment and the Convention’s universality.
An entrenched and central element of employment law structures, Lord Justice Elias recently
issued a powerful reminder that there are limits to the judges’ competences in re-moulding the
doctrines of the contract of employment: ‘it does not follow that because there is a problem, the
judges can fashion the solution. There is a limit to how far they can develop or modify established
doctrines.’41 There seems to be a stalemate. The narrow strictures of the relational scope of
employment rights is contrary to the Convention, but the judges may be unable or unwilling to
alter it, exposing a deficiency in the adaptive approach.
The second obligation falls upon courts and tribunals: to engage with a Convention infringe-
ment where it has occurred and to assess its necessity and proportionality in accordance with the
Convention text and the Court’s case law. Adequate weight must be given to the rights of
the individual in the justification exercise,42 which includes consideration of the legitimate aim,
the necessity of the infringement and whether a less severe alternative would have achieved the
35. Redfearn v UK, n. 15 above, [56].
36. Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v Romania (2014) 58 EHRR 10, [140].
37. See the discussion of ibid and other ECtHR cases in Philippa Collins, ‘The Inadequate Protection of Human Rights in
Unfair Dismissal Law’ (2018) 47 ILJ 504, 512-515.
38. ECHR, Article 14.
39. Simon Deakin and Gillian S Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 159-171.
40. Einat Albin and Jeremias Prassl, ‘Fragmenting Work, Fragmented Regulation’ in Mark Freedland (ed.), The Contract
of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016) in particular 218-224.
41. Patrick Elias, ‘Changes and Challenges to the Contract of Employment’ (2018) 38 OJLS 869, 886.
42. Schüth v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 32, [67].
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same aim. This process examines the substance of the decision and can constitute a fairly invasive
standard of review. It similarly applies to any contractual terms or employer-generated rulebook,43
where such documents have an impact upon the enjoyment and exercise of Convention rights in the
working relationship. Given that those documents grant an employer the powers and discretion to
manage and discipline a worker, it would render the Convention ineffective if judicial authorities
were not mandated to be cautious regarding their interaction with the exercise of fundamental
rights. Previously, some of the difficulties with the law of unfair dismissal’s compliance with these
obligations have been exposed,44 even many years after the Court of Appeal accepted that a
Convention-style justification process is required in cases where an infringement has been found.45
Similarly, the contractual derivation of the common law and its association with freedom of
contract sit uncomfortably with a requirement to scrutinise the content of a contract of employment
and potentially override that contract if its terms or the consequences of its enforcement is found to
be an unjustified breach of a Convention right. Again, we may begin to question whether minor
adjustments to the legal framework of protection will be sufficient to ensure full compliance with
the need to respect the human rights of workers.
If an infringement upon a Convention right is found not to be justified, the final positive obligation
upon Member States is to offer a remedy to the individual. An element of the broader requirement
that states should ‘set up a system for [the right’s] effective protection and implementation in cases of
unlawful interference falling within its scope’,46 there is a clear requirement to offer an adequate
remedy.47 Components of the remedy should include pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, including
for ‘moral injury’, hurt feelings, distress and anxiety.48 Here, the adaptive approach could bring
unfair dismissal law close to compliance, albeit with some fairly significant amendments:49 the
removal of the cap on compensation and of some of the means by which the claimant’s compensation
can be reduced,50 as well as the reversal of the well-established position that non-pecuniary losses are
not recoverable.51 The remedies at common law are, however, severely inadequate, limited as they
are to wages for a short notice period. A complete overhaul of the remedial dimension of this
mechanism would be required, if the adaptive route is to be followed.
Before moving on from the Convention’s framework, it must be acknowledged that the above
expectations arise in conjunction with the Member State’s margin of appreciation. In the context of
qualified rights, the Member States have an opportunity to balance the protection of an individual’s
right against the interests of the community. When examining the balance that has been struck in a
particular instance, the intensity of review by the ECtHR can vary depending on the context.
Lighter touch review occurs where the Member State has a wide margin of appreciation, affording
the authorities of the jurisdiction discretion in deciding how and in what form human rights should
43. Bărbulescu v Romania [2016] IRLR 235.
44. P. Collins, ‘The Inadequate Protection of Human Rights in Unfair Dismissal Law’, n. 37 above.
45. X v Y, n. 14 above.
46. Kyriakides v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 39058/05, [53]-[54]. This obligation is also reinforced by Article 13 ECHR which
provides the right to an effective remedy where the Convention has been violated.
47. ibid.
48. See P. Collins, ‘The Inadequate Protection of Human Rights in Unfair Dismissal Law’, n. 37 above, 526-8.
49. See ibid and Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, n. 16 above, 921.
50. ERA 1996, section 123(6) and Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] 3 WLR 1153, [1988] AC 344, which establishes
a reduction in compensation where the claimant would have been dismissed shortly after the unfair dismissal.
51. See Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson [1973] 1 WLR 45; and Dunnachie v Kingston upon Hull City Council [2004] UKHL
36, [2005] 1 AC 226.
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be safeguarded, and in particular whether an infringement upon a right answers a pressing social
need within that state.52 One might argue that, despite the arguments below, the UK is within its
margin of appreciation with regard to the protection of the qualified rights in the workplace. My
response would be two-fold. Firstly, the margin of appreciation ‘goes hand in hand with a Eur-
opean supervision’53 and it is not within the discretion of the Member State authorities, be they
legislators or adjudicators, to offer no or very limited protection to those rights. Secondly, once we
have ascertained the expectations and demands of the Convention through a reading of its case law,
the margin of appreciation has no role to play in the domestic enforcement and consideration of
Convention rights.54 The domestic courts thus cannot avail themselves of the margin of apprecia-
tion to avoid scrutinising an infringement or complying with the positive obligations set out above.
The margin of appreciation has no role to play in resolving a domestic dispute between an
employer and employee.
III. The tensions between dismissal law and the Convention’s
expectations
Having begun to expose the difficulties of making adjustments to the existing mechanisms to bring
them into line with the Convention’s expectations, this section turns to the specifics of dismissal
law. Whilst others have been optimistic and creative in proposing incremental ways forward, I
offer a contrasting perspective. Elsewhere I have previously observed the barrage of practical
obstacles that face an individual aiming to utilise unfair dismissal law to realise their human rights
arguments,55 but this section takes a different approach. It examines the underlying tensions
between the Convention’s expectations and these causes of action as they have developed. My
analysis focuses in particular on the deficiencies of design of the two remedial mechanisms with
respect to dismissal; on the ‘double subordination’, firstly of the judiciary to the employer and
secondly of the employee’s fundamental rights to the contract of employment; and also on the
reluctance of the judiciary to take into account the continuing necessity of protecting human rights
through dismissal law. This exposition leads to the suggestion, made in section IV, that the optimal
approach is to adopt a dedicated legislative solution, designed to comply with the positive obli-
gations set out above and to offer a high standard of protection to the Convention rights of
individuals at work.
A) The difficulties of ‘repurposing’: The origins and design of dismissal law
When critiquing employment law’s lack of compliance with Convention rights and expectations, it
is difficult to avoid the counter-argument that this function was well outside the contemplation of
those responsible for designing the protections at the point of dismissal. The origins and purpose of
dismissal law, in both its forms, were far-removed from the positive obligations that have since
52. Handyside v United Kingdom (1979) 1 EHRR 737, [48].
53. ibid [49].
54. David Pannick, ‘Principles of interpretation of Convention rights under the Human Rights Act and the discretionary
area of judgment’ [1998] PL 545, 548; and Keir Starmer, European human rights law: the Human Rights Act 1998 and
the European Convention on Human Rights (Legal Action Group, 1999) 190 and see R. (SB) v Governors of Denbigh
High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100, [63] (Lord Hoffman).
55. P. Collins, ‘The Inadequate Protection of Human Rights in Unfair Dismissal Law’, n. 37 above.
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been imposed upon the UK through the European Convention. This historical context also informs
many of the other disjuncts between employment law mechanisms and fundamental rights that are
explored below.
The first observation is the narrow focus of employment law, when contrasted with the uni-
versality obligation outlined above. Both the statutory and common law dismissal protections were
conceived of within the established confines of employment law. It includes a concern for the
safeguarding of a particular type of individual within a particular type of working relationship. The
‘central case’ that has attracted employment law’s attention is the subordinated and dependent
worker who works full-time for a single employer for an indeterminate period of time. Taking a
historical and comparative view, Mark Freedland observes:
‘There is no doubt that most employment law systems reflect a strong intuition that there is a strong and
clear distinction between dependent employment and independent working, and moreover that
employment law is concerned with the former kind of work and not the latter.’56
In English law, the bilateral divide between the ‘contract of service’ and ‘contract for services’
determined the availability of workplace rights. Wrongful dismissal law, in particular the protec-
tion of the terms implied by law,57 and the law of unfair dismissal are only applicable to individuals
who work under a ‘contract of employment’.58 As a result, agency workers, office holders, casual
workers and many others have been excluded from the entitlement to challenge ill-treatment by
their employer.59 The instinct to confine employment law’s personal scope has also been seen in
relation to subsequent, broader statutory definitions.60 The strength of this implicit commitment to
exclude those whose working arrangements are not aligned to the paradigm model of an employee
conflicts with the universality of the Convention’s positive obligations outlined above.
Within that narrow relational focus, each stem of dismissal protection has arisen in a unique
way, with important effects for the feasibility of these mechanisms fulfilling a Convention-based
function. The law of unfair dismissal was created to improve upon the very limited protection
offered to workers by the common law.61 ‘An important catalyst’ for the consensus regarding the
necessity of legislative intervention was the UK’s adoption of the International Labour Organisa-
tion’s Recommendation 119 concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer,62 whilst the Donovan Commission in a report recommending the introduction of stat-
utory dismissal protection observed that the number of unofficial strikes may be reduced by the
availability of quick and impartial dispute resolution where a dismissal was perceived as unjust by
the workforce.63 The Industrial Relations Act 1971 thereafter introduced a right not to be unfairly
dismissed, providing job security to all employees, regardless of whether they also benefitted from
56. Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford University Press, 2003) 20.
57. See Malik v BCCI, n. 28 above.
58. ERA 1996, sections 94 and 230(1).
59. See, amongst others, Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 209, [2015] IRLR 467; Sharpe v Worcester
Diocesan Board of Finance Ltd and another [2015] EWCA Civ 399, [2015] ICR 1241; and O’Kelly and Others v
Trusthouse Forte Plc [1983] 3 WLR 605, [1984] QB 90.
60. Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [2011] 1 WLR 1872; and Windle v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA
Civ 459, [2017] 3 All ER 568.
61. See the account by Lord Hoffman in Johnson v Unisys Ltd, n. 29 above, 543.
62. Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Clarendon Press, 1993) 195.
63. Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965–68 (Cmd 3623, 1968) [528].
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collective bargaining, by requiring a valid reason for a dismissal. The purpose of the legislation
was not, however, to provide safeguards for the fundamental rights of all individuals at work. In
fact, despite offering an interpretation of unfair dismissal law based upon the autonomy and dignity
of the employee, Hugh Collins noted in 1992 that ‘[a] failure to respect civil liberties constitutes
one of the principal sources of injustice in the law of unfair dismissal.’64
The legislative origin of unfair dismissal law also precipitated compromise in the operation of
the right. The compensation available to claimants is subject to an upper limit,65 which, although
substantial, may deprive some claimants of the full amount to which they would otherwise have
been entitled. In addition, the right not to be unfairly dismissal is only available to a sub-group
within the already narrow category of employees discussed above. The requirement that an indi-
vidual must have completed a number of months of service with the employer was originally
introduced to slow the pace of the workload of the Industrial Tribunals upon the creation of its new
jurisdiction.66 Since then, the length of the ‘qualifying period of continuous employment’ has
become a political football used to indicate a government’s stance on the regulation or deregulation
of employing enterprises.67 Currently set at two years, this mechanism deprives individuals of the
opportunity to challenge their employer’s decisions or behaviour solely on the ground that they
joined the enterprise too recently.68 Thus, the instinct to confine employment law to a specific
model of work provision is aggravated by the vagaries of political compromise to generate a legal
mechanism with a narrow reach, destined to be insufficient when compared to the inclusive
approach of the ECtHR and the positive obligations it has set out.
The common law of wrongful dismissal, a termination of employment in breach of contract,
developed from the general law of contract with elements of the old master and servant law.69
Freedom to contract and to determine the terms of a contract in many contexts is liberating for the
parties, but in the employment context, it brings well-known challenges. The employer usually
unilaterally determines the terms and conditions offered, with the individual worker rendered
powerless to resist the contractual imposition.70 Although some safeguards are provided by stat-
utory regulation, the employer’s dominance commences at the point of contract and is reinforced
throughout the relationship until it is terminated. In addition, the judicial viewpoint from which the
common law was, and continues to be, developed is quite particular. Lord Wedderburn highlighted
the importance of the training and legal background of the judges responsible for setting the
direction of the common law. By reason of the English system of judicial selection, he noted that
High Court judges are more likely to be acclimatised to the viewpoint of the employer, embedded
64. Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (Oxford University Press, 1992) 185.
65. ERA 1996, section 124.
66. Davies and Freedland, n. 62 above, 205, 555.
67. Davies and Freedland, ibid at 555, note the deployment of an idea that a shorter qualifying period would decrease the
disincentive of small employers deter employers from hiring new staff and this was echoed in the most recent extension
of the qualifying period by the Coalition government: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Resolving
workplace disputes: A Consultation – Impact Assessment (January 2011) available: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31436/11-512-resolving-workplace-disputes-
impact-assessment.pdf (last accessed 12 April 2019) 147.
68. See Redfearn v United Kingdom, n. 15 above.
69. Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evo-
lution (Oxford University Press, 2005) Chapter 2.
70. A sentiment powerfully expressed recently by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Uber BV and others v Aslam
[2019] IRLR 257, 274.
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particularly within the ‘ideas of contract, property and employer’s prerogative that are central to
the common law.’71 Thus, where a human rights lens would place the individual’s fundamental
rights at the centre of the dispute and scrutinise any infringements upon them, the common law is
framed from almost the opposite perspective: the enforcement of contractual terms and the guar-
antee of employers’ property rights and prerogative is of prime importance.
The development from a contractual starting point and a desire to preserve the employer’s
disciplinary freedom give rise to serious remedial limitations under the common law. Although the
use of injunctions in some cases gave hope of a willingness to tackle breaches of contract on the
employers’ side,72 the damages available are limited. The application of the expectation measure -
what the claimant would have received had the contract been performed - combined with an
employer’s right to terminate by giving a period of notice leads to a minimal sum.73 For example,
in Smith v Trafford Housing Trust, the individual was permanently demoted in breach of contract
and in breach of his human rights but received only £98 in damages: the difference between his
previous wage and his new wage for the duration of his notice period.74 The old rule, established in
Addis v Gramophone,75 that contractual damages do not include injury to feelings caused by the
breach of contract still stands. On this basis, both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary limitations of
contract-based damages are significant when examined in light of the obligation to provide a
remedy for a Convention infringement. But a more serious problem in terms of the common law
granting an effective remedy is the decision in Johnson v Unisys Ltd.76 The claimant sought
damages for a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence for the manner in which
he had been dismissed. The majority of the House of Lords held that, for a variety of reasons, such
a breach of the implied term is not actionable in this way – a breach by the manner of dismissal
does not sound in damages. The contractual derivation of wrongful dismissal law results in serious
concerns regarding its capacity to fulfil the positive obligation to offer any real remedy, let alone an
effective one. There is therefore a serious limitation upon the common law’s capacity to offer
appropriate compensation to a claimant, if it were pressed to perform a human rights protective
function.
B) Double subordination: The subordination of dismissal law to the employer’s prerogative
and the subordination of workers by contract
There is a fundamental tension between the Convention-derived expectations of thorough,
proportionality-style judicial review and the long-standing adjudicative approach in dismissal law.
The ECtHR investigates the legitimate aim pursued by the infringement and particularly asks
whether a less severe disciplinary measure could have been pursued or a less pervasive or
rights-intrusive policy could have been adopted. In contrast, the common law and statutory
mechanisms discussed here have evolved in manner that preserves a wide area of freedom for
71. Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law: Autonomy from the Common Law?’ (1998) 9 CLLJ 219, 234.
72. See Irani v Southampton and South West Hampshire HA [1985] ICR 590; and West London Mental Health NHS Trust v
Chhabra [2013] UKSC 80, [2014] 1 All ER 943.
73. Gunton v Richmond upon Thames LBC [1980] ICR 755, 772.
74. Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2012] EWHC 3320 (Ch).
75. Addis v Gramophone Company Ltd [1909] AC 488.
76. Johnson v Unisys Ltd, n. 29 above.
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employers to establish a ‘miniature legal system’77 of contracts and rulebooks and make decisions
in accordance with these rules and their own interests. Only ‘egregiously unreasonable treatment’
will result in a finding against an employer.78 In turn, I argue that these mechanisms permit
workers’ fundamental rights to be subordinated to their employer’s prerogative and an expansive
range of judicially-accepted powers. This double subordination poses a severe threat to the proper
enjoyment of fundamental rights at work and the fulfilment of the UK’s positive obligations under
the qualified rights.
Possibly as a result of the legal and educational background of the judiciary noted by Lord
Wedderburn, the common law judges have been very willing to prioritise employer preroga-
tive and limit the effectiveness of the safeguards available to workers. Rather than using the
doctrines of contract law to offer an external, objective assessment of the reasonableness of a
term or situation,79 the courts consistently limit their own role and preserve the legal dom-
inance of the employer. We can take two examples to demonstrate this tendency. In Addis v
Gramophone Company,80 the liability of employers who had dismissed an employee in breach
of their contract was deliberately minimised by the House of Lords. Their Lordships excluded
the possibility of employees receiving compensation for injured feelings, for the manner of
dismissal and for the loss sustained because dismissal makes re-employment more difficult.81
The decision demonstrated a ‘contractual entrenchment of the employer’s disciplinary powers
in the twilight of the Master and Servant legislation’.82 More recently, in the case of Johnson
v Unisys Ltd,83 it was decided that a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confi-
dence that occurred as a result of the manner of dismissal is not actionable under the common
law. The employer’s express right to terminate by giving notice was considered to be in
conflict with such a development and the express term was cited as a reason to prevent the
common law development that would have offered additional protection at the point of
dismissal.84 The judiciary thus displays a continuing tendency to prioritise the terms of the
contract, which are usually unilaterally determined, whilst minimising the extent of protection
available to employees. As there is no express requirement upon employers to take into
account the fundamental rights of their employees, the refusal to develop protection alongside
the express terms of the contract is particularly concerning.
The judicial reluctance to challenge employers’ decision-making is at its most prominent in
unfair dismissal law. Whilst the importation of public law standards, such as requirements of
natural justice and rationality, into dismissal law may have originally been greeted with opti-
mism that it may temper the employer’s exercise of their powers,85 its effect in unfair dismissal
law has been a renunciation by the tribunals of their capacity to set standards for employer
77. Hugh Collins, ‘Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the Contract of Employment’ (1986) 15 ILJ 1, 4.
78. Steven Anderman, ‘Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?’ in Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin and
Gillian S Morris (eds.), The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob Hepple QC (Hart Publishing, 2004) 111.
79. A rare example of such an exercise is Briggs J’s judgment in Smith v Trafford Housing Trust, n. 27 above.
80. Addis v Gramophone Company Ltd, n. 75 above.
81. ibid, 491.
82. Alan Bogg and Mark Freedland, ‘The Wrongful Termination of the Contract of Employment’ in Mark Freedland (ed.),
The Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press, 2016) 543.
83. Johnson v Unisys Ltd, n. 29 above.
84. ibid [38]-[42] (Lord Hoffman).
85. See John Laws, ‘Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power’ [1997] PL 455; and Paul Davies and Mark
Freedland, ‘The Impact of Public Law on Labour Law, 1972-1997’ (1997) 26 ILJ 311, 325.
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behaviour.86 In ascertaining whether a dismissal was fair, the legislation asks whether the
employer was reasonable or unreasonable in treating the reason cited as sufficient to justify the
dismissal.87 In judicial hands, this question has morphed into a ‘range of reasonable responses’
test: the employer must only satisfy the tribunal that the dismissal decision fell within a range of
reasonable responses that a reasonable employer could have made in the circumstances.88 The
deference shown by tribunals through the use of this test has been consistently questioned by
observers.89 Its implicit submission to employer expertise on managerial questions, when com-
bined with the acquiescence of the adjudicators to the terms of the employer’s rulebook, leads to
a severe lack of scrutiny under the statutory mechanism. In contrast, a human rights approach
would require detailed review of the substance of an employer’s decision to dismiss, thoroughly
examining whether the reason given was sufficient to justify a severe infringement upon the
individual’s rights and whether an alternative measure could have been appropriate.
The entrenched judicial acceptance that employers are able to introduce a wide range of rules
and provisions that regulate the workplace and employee behaviour developed well before the
need to take human rights into account within private relationships was realised. Once the same
types of terms and internal regulation have been enforced by courts time after time, the judges
struggle to see that they amount to or provide capacity for employers to infringe upon Convention
rights. For example, it is now assumed by many (including the judiciary) that managerial control
and influence, already secure during working time, can legitimately be extended to the individual’s
activities outside of work.90 In the interests of protecting its business reputation, an employer may
investigate an employee’s social media presence and discipline them if the content is considered to
pose even a remote risk of reputational harm. This intrusion of employers into the personal lives of
employees amounts to an infringement upon their Article 8 rights at the very least,91 but the
judiciary seem to be blind to their obligation to examine the rights violation.92 With regard to the
exercise of human rights in the workplace or during working time, cases regarding a clash between
human rights and the employer’s powers have a sense of fait accompli. This inevitability was
amply shown in an EAT decision regarding the potential Article 8 dimension of a case in which the
employee had been subject to extensive covert surveillance arranged by his employer. Langstaff J,
then President of the EAT, stated that:
‘It is a feature of an employment contract that an employee is subject to the reasonable direction of his
employer. An employer is thus entitled to know where someone is and what they are doing in the
employer’s time. An employee can have no reasonable expectation that he can keep those matters
86. For an analysis of the ‘self-restraint’ of the judges in unfair dismissal law, see ACL Davies, ‘Judicial Self-restraint in
Labour Law’ (2009) 38 ILJ 278, 291-294.
87. ERA 1996, section 98(4)(a).
88. British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91, 93 (Lord Denning MR).
89. Anderman, n. 78 above, 127; Mark Freedland and Hugh Collins, ‘Finding the Right Direction for the ‘Industrial Jury’’
(2000) 29 ILJ 288; Andy Freer, ‘The Range of Reasonable Responses Test - From Guidelines to Statute’ (1998) 27 ILJ
335; and Davies, n. 86 above.
90. See commentary by Astrid Sanders, ‘The law of unfair dismissal and behaviour outside work’ (2014) 34 LS 328; and
Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’ (2008) 71 MLR 912.
91. See Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘‘‘I Lost My Job over a Facebook Post: Was that Fair?’’ Discipline and Dismissal for Social
Media Activity’ (2019) 35 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 101, 112-113.
92. See, for example, the first instance decisions in Gibbins v British Council (2017) ET 2200088/2017, Plant v API
Microelectronics Limited (2016) ET 3401454/2016 and Burns v Surrey County Council (2017) ET 2301665/2016.
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private and secret from his employer at such a time. To do so would be to run contrary to the contract he
had entered with his employer.’93
Systematic enforcement of the contractual terms and powers of the employer by the common
law over a period of years has led to a similarly systematic failure to comply with the positive
obligation to examine an infringement of a Convention right for its aim, necessity and
proportionality.
This statement also shows the dominance of the terms of the contract over the exercise of human
rights whilst at work and the subordination of the employee’s enjoyment of their fundamental
rights to the employer’s prerogative. If an employee wishes to retain their employment, they must
submit to the employer’s rules and systems and thereby implicitly sacrifice their ability freely to
exercise the fundamental rights set out above. The common law has played a role in reinforcing the
employer’s jurisdiction over its workers, implying duties to obey the employer’s orders, to co-
operate in the employer’s enterprise and to maintain the employer’s trust and confidence into the
contract of employment.94 It is argued here that by placing their expertise in a secondary position
to that of the employer, and failing to challenge or re-interpret terms that limit or prevent the
exercise of fundamental rights by individuals, the courts have created a situation in which the
enjoyment of those rights is subordinated to the contract of employment and managerial preroga-
tive. This degradation of the position of workers’ rights in the employment context is in opposition
to the expectations upon Member States of the Council of Europe.
C) A conflicted judiciary: Confidence and reticence combined
All of the above is compounded by the current judicial attitude towards human rights arguments in
the sphere of employment law. Whilst there are highlights of proactive judicial engagement with
Convention rights,95 most judgments show a lack of urgency in ensuring that the structures and
decisions made when applying dismissal law comply with the Convention. There is a perception
that the mechanisms of employment law already provide an adequate standard of protection for
human rights.96 One judge has gone so far as saying that dismissal law offers a more stringent
standard of scrutiny than the ECtHR.97 This perception goes against the weight of academic
opinion and can be questioned in light of Strasbourg’s case law.98 Its effect, nonetheless, is to
leave dismissal law somewhat stuck in a rut, complacent in its supposed successes and failing to
recognise its own flaws.
93. City and County of Swansea v Gayle (2013) UKEAT/0501/12/RN, [15].
94. Respectively, Laws v London Chronicle Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 698, 700; Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF
[1972] ICR 19 and other cases discussed in Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract, n. 57 above, 147-149; and
Malik v BCCI, n. 28 above.
95. See Vining and others v London Borough of Wandsworth, n. 14 above; Hill v Governing Body of Great Tey Primary
School [2013] ICR 691; and Gilham v Ministry of Justice, n. 14 above.
96. See judicial statements of this kind, of a more or less explicit nature, in X v Y, n. 14 above, [59] (Mummery LJ); Turner
v East Midlands Trains Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1470, [2013] ICR 525, [52] (Elias LJ) and [75] (Sir Stephen Sedley); and
Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932, [2005] ICR 1789, [89] (Neuberger LJ).
97. Turner v East Midlands Trains Ltd, ibid, [56].
98. Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, n. 16 above, 921; David Cabrelli,
‘The Hierarchy of Differing Behavioural Standards of Review in Labour Law’ (2011) 40 ILJ 146, 163; and Collins and
Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’, n. 16 above, 205.
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With regard to the common law, rulings are handed down that demonstrate a disparity between
dismissal law and the Convention standards. For example, in Ahmed v Amnesty International,99
despite holding that the employee had been racially discriminated against under the Equality Act,
Ms Ahmed’s argument that her employer had breached the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence was unsuccessful. The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the discriminatory
behaviour, a clear breach of the fundamental right to be treated equally, did not breach the implied
term. The EAT considered that the employer’s conduct was simply not grave enough to seriously
damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and employee.100 Similar
outcomes have occurred in other discrimination-related complaints,101 as well as cases regarding
potential whistleblowers,102 which engages the individual’s Article 10 right to freedom of
expression.
The same issue also arises in the reverse: employers can discipline on the basis of the
implied term of mutual trust and confidence, even where the criticised conduct of the
employee is an exercise of their Convention right. For example, five years before his dis-
missal, Mr Williams had sent a supposedly humorous, but pornographic, email to a number of
contacts through his work account. When the employer hired forensic investigators to find a
reason to justify his dismissal, they argued that the sending of this email amounted to a breach
of the implied obligation of sufficient seriousness to warrant dismissal without notice. The
High Court found in favour of the employer,103 disregarding both the fact that the employ-
ment relationship had continued for five years after the correspondence and that the employ-
er’s own Code of Conduct indicated that such an incident would be considered a serious
disciplinary offence, rather than gross misconduct. The court in Williams v Leeds United
should have engaged with the Article 8 aspects of the case, and also Article 10 which protects
offensive expression as well as widely accepted views.104 By permitting the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence to be used in this fashion, the courts undermine the enjoyment
and protection of Convention rights in the workplace. These cases demonstrate that the
common law regulation of dismissal, in particular the implied obligation that is central to
many claims, falls well short of complying with the Convention’s requirements.
Under the Employment Rights Act 1996, it has been accepted for a number of years that a
Convention-style proportionality analysis is necessary when a human right is infringed upon by a
dismissal.105 Examining cases where the tribunal judge does engage with that justification process,
I have not yet found one in which the ultimate result was altered by its integration.106 The overall
99. Amnesty International v Ahmed [2009] ICR 1450.
100. ibid [72].
101. Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1493, [2005] ICR 481; and Grant v South-
West Trains Ltd [1998] IRLR 188.
102. Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562.
103. Williams v Leeds United Football Club, n. 20 above.
104. Handyside v United Kingdom, n. 52 above, [49].
105. See Lord Justice Mummery’s ‘long answer’ in X v Y, n. 14 above.
106. See Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] ICR 187; McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167; Fosh v
Cardiff University (2008) Appeal No. UKEAT/0412/07/DM; Henderson v London Borough of Hackney (2009)
Appeal No. UKEAT/0072/09/JOJ; A v B (2010) Appeal No. UKEAT/0206/09/SM; Preece v J D Wetherspoons [2011]
ET 2104806/10; Crisp v Apple Retail UK Ltd [2011] ET 1500258/11; City and County of Swansea v Gayle (2013)
UKEAT/0501/12/RN (obiter); Barton v Royal Borough of Greenwich (2015) Appeal No. UKEAT/0041/14/DXA; A v
B Local Authority [2016] EWCA Civ 766, [2016] IRLR 779; and Garamukanwa v Solent NHS Trust [2016] IRLR
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picture that one receives when reading the case law is that the standard analysis noted above – the
‘range of reasonable responses’ test – is applied to the facts and a conclusion that the dismissal was
fair is reached. At this stage, the tribunal considers briefly, and not always by asking the correct
questions,107 whether the Convention is relevant and, if so, whether the infringement was justified.
In light of the ready judicial acceptance of the rules and the decisions made by employers and the
view that the mechanisms of employment law already achieve Convention compliance, the ulti-
mate outcome of the case is unchanged. It is also compounded by a narrow conceptualisation of the
Convention rights themselves.108 I would argue that, in many of these cases, a different conclusion
could have been reached. One point highlighted by the ECtHR in its consideration of employment
disputes is whether a less severe sanction could have been a viable alternative.109 This question is
never seriously considered by the tribunals, even though it could pose a serious challenge to the
employer’s decision and reverse the outcome of the case. The absence of any sincere attempts to
re-evaluate the proportionality and necessity of a dismissal in light of the Convention leaves
serious questions with regard to the current and future compliance with the UK’s obligations set
out in section II.
IV. A legislative solution: Introducing a Bill of Rights for Workers
Although there is optimism in some quarters regarding the capacity of the mechanisms and
doctrines of employment law to fulfil a new function, that of protecting the fundamental rights
of individuals, I have argued that this optimism is misplaced. In essence, the current approach is
attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. From the origins of dismissal law and employment
law’s established concerns, issues of design arise: a narrow scope of protection, the contractual
basis of wrongful dismissal and the legislative compromises of unfair dismissal law. We can also
see evidence of entrenched and uncritical acceptance of the extent of employer’s disciplinary
powers and judicial restraint in reviewing how they are exercised. These deficiencies are com-
pounded by a more recent perception that employment law already offers sufficient safeguards for
Convention rights and a reluctance amongst adjudicators to engage in anything other than a
perfunctory check upon their prior conclusion. These trends and problems indicate that, not only
is the UK currently offering an insufficient standard of protection for the fundamental rights of
individuals at work, but it is unlikely to do so if attempted within the current framework. In what
follows, I propose an alternative way forward. The legislative solution offered below would break
apart from the patterns that have been explored above, giving dedicated and direct horizontal
enforcement to the human rights of individuals at work.
476. One exception may be Hill v Great Tey Primary School, n. 95 above, where the EAT remitted the case to a
Tribunal with explicit instruction to consider the text of Article 10 of the Convention.
107. See the criticism of the Tribunal’s decision in Hill v Great Tey Primary School, n. 95 above, and the brief analysis of
the Article 10 point in Preece v J D Wetherspoons, n. 106 above, [40].
108. See for example the conceptualisation of Article 8 in Pay v Lancashire Probation Service, n. 106 above, commented
upon by Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’, n. 90 above, 919-921.
109. The Court indicated in Pay v United Kingdom (Admissibility Decision) (2009) 48 EHRR SE2 that a less severe
sanction may have been appropriate but the decision was ultimate decided under the less searching standard of
scrutiny entailed by the margin of appreciation, mentioned above.
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A) The nature of the proposal and the necessity of new legislation
The current focus of the debate in this area is upon how existing mechanisms could be ‘re-
purposed’ to protect Convention rights. Prospects for judicial development, of the common law
or of statutory interpretation and application, and arguments in favour of legislative amendments,
have been put forward.110 I note several key problems with this type of approach. First, it maintains
continuity between the existing doctrines and approach and the refreshed, Convention-compliant
mechanism. Given the entrenched tensions and deficiencies noted throughout this piece and the
unfortunate persistence of both a complacent and unenthusiastic judicial attitude towards the
incorporation of the Convention in dismissal law, this is a significant limitation of this route to
compliance with the positive obligations above. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 has been
in force for twenty years, and there is no evidence that it has prompted a major change in
consideration of dismissals that infringe upon the worker’s human rights. Amendments that have
been made to the law of unfair dismissal have also been noted for their minimalism.111 Further
amendments and developments could be considered to be both unlikely to occur, in light of the
understanding of employment law as already compliant, and unlikely to result in genuine and
effective protection of Convention rights.
The second concern with this idea of adjusting existing structures to play this new role is that of
a tiering of cases within employment law and a neglect of arguments for reform of these rights and
mechanisms to better achieve their original purpose. With regard to the first, we can already see the
evidence of the differential treatment of claimants able to raise human rights arguments when
compared to those who are not. We might contrast, for example, the result in Redbridge LBC v
Dhinsa and MacKinnon112 with the outcome in Vining v London Borough of Wandsworth.113 In
Dhinsa, the claimants were members of the parks police, employed to patrol the parks and open
spaces of the area. After their dismissal and resignation respectively, they sought to claim unfair
dismissal. Section 200 of the ERA excludes from the right to claim unfair dismissal those working
under ‘contract of employment in police service’.114 The Court of Appeal, upon examining the
nature of the claimants’ occupation, held that section 200 operated to preclude them from bringing
a claim challenging the fairness of their dismissal.115 In contrast, Mr Vining’s union, when making
a complaint regarding the lack of collective consultation regarding parks police redundancies, was
permitted to progress its claim despite an equivalent provision. The Court of Appeal, after a
consideration of Article 11 ECHR and through an application of section 3 HRA, reached the
conclusion that the exclusion should not apply to parks police such as Mr Vining.116 The union’s
case could therefore be heard by an Employment Tribunal. This comparison demonstrates the
impact that a human rights argument can have (in rare cases) for some individuals. My concern
with using existing mechanisms for human rights purposes, however, is that the likes of Mr Dhinsa
and Mr MacKinnon are left with inadequate safeguards and unable to challenge their treatment by
110. See the works cited at footnote 16 above.
111. See Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, n. 16 above, 915.
112. Redbridge London Borough Council v Dhinsa and another [2014] EWCA Civ 178, [2014] ICR 834.
113. Vining and others v London Borough of Wandsworth, n. 14 above.
114. ERA 1996, section 200.
115. Redbridge v McKinnon, n. 112 above, [70].
116. Vining and others v London Borough of Wandsworth, n. 14 above. For an in-depth analysis of Vining, see Philippa
Collins and Paul Fradley, ‘Policing the Boundaries of Articles 8 and 11 ECHR’ (2019) 48 ILJ 225.
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their employer. Individuals who do not have human rights arguments on their side are unable to
persuade the courts to re-shape the law in their favour, leading to a division or a ‘tiering’ of
protection between groups of workers.
This practical differentiation in treatment is a symptom of a more abstract issue: if the focus is
trained upon how dismissal law can be adapted in order to fulfil a human rights function, its
capacity - or lack thereof - to perform its original purpose may be overlooked. A comment by
Fenwick and Novitz is interesting in this regard:
‘understanding the protection of workers’ interests as human rights is likely to broaden their appeal at a
time of marginalisation of trade unions as antiquated and outdated organisations. What may be
problematic . . . is that one may implicitly denigrate the status of workers’ claims where it is more
difficult to phrase them in terms of human rights.’117
The higher normative status of human rights claims attracts attention and rightfully leads to
demands for action where they are not respected. But employment law fulfils functions and pursues
purposes far broader than safeguarding individual’s fundamental rights. At a more abstract level,
values such as social justice,118 equality,119 freedom,120 autonomy121 and dignity122 are all aspira-
tions of employment law. At the functional level, we might think of job security, decent and safe
working conditions, fair remuneration, and representation and voice at work. A focus on a nar-
rowly defined group of fundamental rights risks neglecting arguments for reform, development and
improvement of these mechanisms on their own terms. If critical attention and pressure dissipates
on these wider points, it is at least foreseeable that the status quo in employment law would be
maintained without the benefit of enhancements and advances that can result from sustained
evaluative efforts.
It is therefore argued that a clean break from the prior structures and case law through the
introduction of a new legal structure designed specifically to protect human rights at work and
comply with the positive obligations under the Convention is desirable. In the UK, a straightfor-
ward way of enforcing human rights against employers would be to regulate them in the same way
as public authorities through an amendment to the HRA. Such an approach would certainly give
direct horizontal effect to Convention rights in the employment relationship. Nevertheless, it is
argued here that this route would be inappropriate. There are important differences between
employers and the state that mean regulating them in an identical fashion is undesirable.
117. Tonia Novitz and Colin Fenwick, ‘The Application of Human Rights Discourse to Labour Relations: Translation of
Theory into Practice’ in Tonia Novitz and Colin Fenwick (eds.), Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and
Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2010) 24.
118. See Ruth Dukes, ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labor Law’
(2008) 35 Journal of Law & Society 341, 345.
119. Judy Fudge, ‘Labour As a ‘Fictive Commodity’: Radically Reconceptualizing Labour Law’ in Guy Davidov and
Brian Langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).
120. Brian Langille, ‘Labour Law’s Theory of Justice’ in Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 112 and Alan Bogg and Cynthia Estlund, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to
Contest’ in Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz (eds.), Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World
(Oxford University Press, 2014) 151-159.
121. As in Spector’s theory of ‘equal autonomy’: Horacio Spector, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law’ (2006) 33
Florida State University Law Review 1119.
122. David C. Yamada, ‘Human Dignity and American Employment Law’ (2009) 43 University of Richmond Law Review
523.
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Employers can only be expected to weigh up policies and human rights impact within their own
organisation, lacking the broad-ranging expertise and responsibilities of the state. In addition, the
employer itself possesses rights that must be weighed in the balance:123 its right to reputation and a
right to property, as well as potentially aspects of freedom of association or belief, for example in
the case of a religious employer. The contractual underpinning of the whole relationship also
provides a new challenge which is not present in the citizen-state relationship regulated under the
Human Rights Act. Thus, it is clear that a dedicated approach to introducing direct horizontal
duties must be used, which is tailored to the employment context. The proposal here would have
autonomy from the existing causes of action, although drawing on their successes in its design, and
offers a variety of ways to challenge employer conduct and policies that are incompatible with the
human rights of the workforce. The following section begins to sketch out the potential features of
a such legislative scheme. In doing so, the paper moves beyond a focus purely on dismissal and
includes reference to other forms of detriment that could amount to a human rights infringement or
limitation.
B) The central prohibitions: Safeguarding Convention rights through novel means
A legislative system of protection would have to provide a range of safeguards for workers in order
to comply adequately with the positive obligations set out above. Enforced by a claim to the
Employment Tribunal,124 the centrepiece of the mechanism would be a general prohibition of
unjustified infringements upon a worker’s human rights. Although the focus of this article has been
on the qualified rights, there is no reason to exclude the other Convention rights: the right to a fair
trial in Article 6 is of relevance to disciplinary processes and the prohibition of forced labour in
Article 4 could be expressly protected via statute. At the core of the mechanism would be a
prohibition such as the following:
An employer shall not infringe the human rights of its workers, as defined by the European Convention
on Human Rights and given further effect by the Human Rights Act 1998.
In accordance with the principles set out in the Convention, where a qualified right has been breached,
an infringement will only be justified if it satisfies the requirements set out in this Bill.
This provision sets out a strong link between the national regulatory attempt and the Convention
and the detail of the provisions should ensure that the standard of protection does not fall below
that which is available to individuals before the Strasbourg Court.125
123. See Collins, ‘On the Incompatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’, n. 17 above, 50.
124. Employment Tribunals have expertise in hearing complaints relating to employment and there may be concurrent
claims, for example, under the Equality Act 2010 or the Employment Rights Act 1996. It could be argued that
expertise for interpreting and enforcing the ECHR lies in the Administrative Court, so the Administrative Court may
constitute an appropriate forum as well.
125. Any legislative instrument would have to set out the precise nature of the link to the ECtHR’s decisions: I would argue
in favour of an approach that draws out the broad principles set out through the ECtHR’s jurisprudence (for an
advocate of a similar approach under section 2 HRA, see Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act
1998: binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] Public Law 725, 735-737; and Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the
Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a ‘Municipal Law of Human Rights’ under the Human Rights
Act’ (2008) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 907) whilst also ensuring that national courts are not
held back by the terms of that link to the Convention from providing a greater level of protection to the claimant.
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Within the central prohibition, the element upon which the standard of protection for individ-
uals would hinge is the justification process. In light of the ECHR’s positive obligations as set out
above, the justification process must balance two functions. First, it must ensure that the individ-
ual’s human rights remain central to the dispute and are not outweighed too readily, particularly by
economically-motivated aims.126 But secondly, the justification process is also the means by which
the employer’s rights are given due regard127 and it manages the size of the burden imposed upon
employers.128 The detail, interpretation and application of the process of justification must be fine-
tuned to adequately take into account legitimate employer concerns, but not to excuse employers
on grounds that are insufficiently weighty.
The UK Supreme Court’s statement of the elements of a justification/proportionality analysis
would be a useful guide for the courts:
(1) ‘whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a
protected right,
(2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective,
(3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromis-
ing the achievement of the objective, and
(4) . . . whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit
of the impugned measure.’129
How should the assessment at stage (1) be made? Existing rights display a number of
approaches, each with benefits and drawbacks. At the level of the Strasbourg Court, any aim cited
must fall within the broadly phrased text of the Convention, but both the text and the case law focus
upon justifications put forward by Member States, so cannot be directly transferred to the employ-
ment context. The Equality Act 2010 leaves the selection of legitimate aims to the courts, which
allows for responsiveness to changing circumstances but leaves the possibility that courts could
expand the range of accepted aims and thereby diminish the protection for the right not to be
discriminated against. Unfair dismissal law contains a list of potentially fair reasons for a dis-
missal, such as capacity of the individual or their conduct, and adds ‘some other substantial reason
of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee . . . ’130 The inclusion of ‘some other
substantial reason’ can be interpreted as a ‘safety valve, allowing a potentially fair dismissal in
situation closely analogous to those listed.’131
This final style of drafting could be adopted to ensure that an infringement is justified by an
important aim, whilst retaining room for manoeuvre for the courts:
Where appropriate, a ‘legitimate aim’ for the purpose of the Bill is limited to:
126. Manfred Weiss, ‘Re-Inventing Labour Law?’ in Brian Langille and Guy Davidov (eds), The Idea of Labour Law
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 50; Judy Fudge, ‘The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental
Rights’ (2007) 29 CLLJ 29, 39, and Sandra Fredman, ‘Equality Law: Labour Law or an Autonomous Field?’ in Alan
Bogg, Cathryn Costello, ACL Davies and Jeremias Prassl (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart Publishing, 2015)
273.
127. Hugh Collins, ‘Justice for Foxes: Fundamental Rights and Justification of Indirect Discrimination’ in Hugh Collins
and Tarunabh Khaitan (eds.), Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, 2018) 269-270.
128. Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 197-8.
129. Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 38, [2014] AC 700, [74] per Lord Reed.
130. ERA 1996, section 98(1) and (2).
131. Deakin and Morris, n. 39 above, 526.
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(a) the protection or advancement of the employer’s fundamental rights as defined by the
ECHR; or
(b) the protection or advancement of the fundamental rights of others as defined by the
ECHR; or
(c) some other similarly substantial aim which is considered sufficiently pressing to justify
the limitation of a Convention right.
As we can see from this list, the employer would not in general have recourse to public interests
of the kind usually seen in vertical human rights litigation,132 but rather it must rely upon the
protection of its own rights or that of other affected parties as the justification for its infringement.
The latter may include, for example, protecting the right to equality of service users in introducing
an equal treatment policy or safeguarding the company’s reputation in circumstances where an
individual’s freedom of expression may negatively affect it. Once a legitimate aim has been
accepted, the courts should examine whether the employing entity was responding reasonably
to a real risk to their business at the time of the infringement. For example, the ECtHR has
emphasised that a ‘mere allegation’ of a threat to an employer’s rights is insufficient: the risk to
the employer must be ‘real and substantial’ and the interference must not serve any other purpose
that is unrelated to the employer’s cited aim.133 Such a demand would prevent employers taking
action on the basis of hypothetical or trivial risks to their business or responding to threats that have
since been proved to be benign.134
The remaining elements of the proportionality of the employer’s actions would then be ana-
lysed. The rational connection test will rarely amount to a serious hurdle, whereas the less intrusive
means question has the potential to challenge employers. For example, a less absolute policy or a
disciplinary warning in place of a dismissal may be judged to have been a reasonable response.
This would prompt a finding against the employer. The final limb provides an opportunity to
consider the impact of the employer’s conduct or policies upon the workforce more broadly.
Where the policy has a particularly damaging impact on one individual or indeed a negative
impact upon a larger group of current or future employees, this impact must be balanced against,
and justified by, clear and definite benefits for the employer. Where the impact of the measure is
more severe, this stage will present a higher hurdle. When considered fully, these four stages strike
a fair balance between giving respect to the claimant’s fundamental rights and permitting the
defendant some scope to pursue other, equally important aims.
Alongside this principal prohibition, employment law routinely includes protection for indi-
viduals who exercise their rights from retaliation by the employer.135 Penalising retaliatory con-
duct would clearly be essential, assuring workers that they will not face detriment for enforcing
their human rights. Similarly crucial would be a section that renders unenforceable any attempt to
132. Subsection (c) could be used for this purpose where the employer is also a public authority: in this event, the employer
may, for example, seek to rely on the safeguarding of national security to limit their employees’ freedom of
expression.
133. Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v Romania, n. 36 above, [159].
134. Thus preventing instances such as Williams v Leeds United Football Club, n. 20 above: Leeds United Football Club
dismissed Mr Williams in response to an incident that had occurred five years previously and had not produced any
damage to the Club’s reputation.
135. See in particular the group of automatically unfair dismissal reasons in the ERA 1996, section 43 M onwards, as well
as provisions such as section 27 in the Equality Act 2010.
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exclude the legislation’s effects or otherwise contradict its provisions.136 Another useful tool
would be something similar to Gillian Morris’ recommendation: ‘a mechanism for workers to
challenge the propriety of contractual clauses which they consider violate a Convention right
without having to await the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for breach of contract’.137
Workers should be able to bring a challenge against a particular term, contractual provision or
workplace rule before it ‘bites’ and negatively effects them. Any regulation associated with their
employment that removes or restricts an individual’s ability to exercise their fundamental rights
should be subjected to a justification and proportionality analysis by a court. These provisions
would ensure that the courts and tribunals do not unthinkingly enforce a contractual provision
which permits an unjustified infringement upon an individual’s rights and protect individuals from
being targeted by their employer after making a claim.
For these latter provisions, contractual rectification by the tribunal could follow, or a recom-
mendation that the employing entity reconsider their policies and practices in order to avoid the
negative impact upon the enjoyment of Convention rights.138 For other Convention violations,
compensation applying the more generous tortious measure and providing compensation for
pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary losses, including injury to feelings, should be available.
Although it is unlikely that an individual would want to return to work after a successful claim,
it may be desirable to allow the adjudicator to consider whether reinstatement or re-engagement is
possible upon the claimant’s request. This capacity is little used in unfair dismissal law,139 but it
may be suitable for rare cases. Similarly, in some cases, interim injunctions could be used to
prevent ongoing events within an employing organisation that violate the individual’s Convention
rights. Examples might include ongoing disciplinary investigations in breach of Article 8, the
continuing enforcement of rules that prevent the full exercise of a Convention right or reliance
upon a clause prohibiting disclosure of information by an individual in breach of their rights. Such
a range of remedial options would ensure that each successful claimant is able to receive an
effective remedy for the infringement upon their rights.
Concluding remarks
These proposals are a novel solution to a serious defect of both national employment law and the
standard of protection offered therein of human rights in an important context in the day-to-day
lives of many. A number of interesting opportunities for expansion could be noted, including, for
example, the inclusion of other rights, such as purely procedural ‘fair trial’ rights or the social and
economic rights contained in the European Social Charter. An additional innovation could be to
allow challenges to other legislative instruments on the basis that they interfere with, or are
inconsistent with, the collection of rights in the Bill. This would negotiate the difficult problem
of infringements that are legitimate and lawful based upon standards and procedures contained in
other statutes. Drawing upon the mechanics of section 4 of the HRA, a declaration could be the
result of such a challenge, and it could be complemented by a more general obligation to read other
instruments compatibly with the fundamental rights of workers. These additions would offer more
136. ERA 1996, section 203(1).
137. Gillian Morris, ‘Fundamental Rights: Exclusion by Agreement?’ (2001) 30 ILJ 49, 70.
138. As in the EA 2010, section 143 and section 124(2)(c) and (3) as originally enacted.
139. See Table 5.5 in Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal
Applications 2013 (Research Series No. 117, 2014).
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rounded protection to fundamental rights at work and hold legislators to account for ongoing
infringements via statutory provisions.
This group of proposals respond to the severe deficiencies in the current approach to providing
protection for human rights at work exposed by this piece. Although the gap in the domestic
framework was first observed almost thirty years ago,140 the methods employed by courts or
advocated for by commentators are insufficiently radical to meet the requirements of the Conven-
tion. It may be that other jurisdictions share some or all of the challenges outlined here. Where the
ECtHR examines all infringements, from complainants of all kinds, employment law’s scope
remains steadfastly narrow. The justification and proportionality assessment entailed by an
infringement of a qualified right has the potential to probe decision making, particularly asking
whether less severe alternatives would have achieved the same goal. The courts in domestic
dismissal cases appear to be incapable of taking such review seriously and of questioning the
employer’s decision and practices. Finally, the remedial response at both common law and through
the statute are seriously deficient. In the face of these systematic limitations, I argue that a new
legislative regime is necessary which would place human rights protection on a firm foundation
and provide innovative safeguards for individuals at work. Whilst some jurisdictions have moved
towards direct horizontal effect of human rights,141 this tailored solution would go beyond general
negative prohibitions and could be a useful addition to the regulation of employer power in other
labour law systems facing similar difficulties.
In the absence such a statutory intervention, two particular consequences follow. Firstly,
employment law’s mechanisms fail properly to reflect the humanity of the individuals who make
up the workforce. By inadequately recognising and safeguarding the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals in the workplace, the law does not manifest the key principle adopted by the International
Labour Organisation: ‘labour is not a commodity’.142 Relatedly, as an autonomous discipline,
employment law also fails to fulfil a widely accepted purpose of its own. The protection of the
humanity, and human rights, of workers is recognised as a crucial agenda of employment law143 –
not as an imposition or demand of a constitutional statute, but as its own organic concern, alongside
striving for dignity, autonomy, equality and other values.
In addition, threats to the enjoyment and exercise of human rights have long been recog-
nised to emanate from a wider range of actors than simply those traditionally targeted by
constitutions and human rights treaties. In order for human rights to be safeguarded fully, they
must be protected in all contexts of daily importance to individuals, whether they are classi-
fied by legal study as ‘public’ or ‘private’. Employers hold a significant influence over the
course of the day-to-day lives of those whom they employ and the disciplinary sanctions
applied by employers have been compared in their consequences to those applied by criminal
140. Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment, n. 64 above, 185.
141. See Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘France - Horizontal Application and the Triumph of the European Convention on Human
Rights’; and Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect – A Successful Experiment?’
in Human Rights and the Private Sphere, n. 8 above.
142. International Labour Organisation, Declaration of Philadelphia (General Conference, 10 May 1944) I.
143. For a selection of endorsements of the position that human rights should be protected at work, see Collins, Justice in
Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment, n. 64 above, 183; Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom:
Further Essays in Labour Law (Lawrence & Wishart, 1995) 350; Keith Ewing, ‘Rights at the Workplace: An Agenda
for Labour Law’ in Aileen McColgan (ed.), The Future of Labour Law (Cassell, 1996) 9-10, and Weiss, n. 126 above,
50.
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law.144 In a relationship of such importance for an individual’s socio-economic wellbeing, for
their fulfilment and self-esteem, and in the presence of such a severe power imbalance
between the two parties, the protection of human rights in employment is especially necessary
and urgent. Whilst some attempts have been made to reshape domestic labour law in line with
human rights concerns, I have argued here that a bolder approach is necessary, a Bill of
Rights for workers, and set out how it could best be formulated in the work sphere.
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